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In the union budget 2008-09, the government has proposed a commodity transaction 
tax (CTT) of 0.017% which would increase total transaction cost of futures trading in 
commodity markets. In this context, the objective of the paper is to assess the 
relationship between trading activity, volatility and transaction cost. Further, the paper 
also attempts to examine the nexus between inflation and futures trading for five 
major commodities traded on futures exchange. The findings of this paper, it is hoped, 
will contribute to the general debate on the welfare implications of future commodity 
markets.  This is an exploratory study examining the impact of CTT on certain 
dimensions such as trading volume and volatility only for top five commodities traded 
in one futures exchange. These results need to be reinforced by further research 
undertaken for a larger number of commodities and other futures exchanges. ICRIER 














Trading in commodity derivatives on exchange platforms is an instrument to achieve 
price discovery, better price risk management, besides helping macro-economy with 
better resource allocation. Since the inception (2003) of national online trading on 
multi-commodity exchange platforms, the trade volumes have grown exponentially. 
In the union budget 2008-09, the government has proposed to impose a commodity 
transaction tax (CTT) of 0.017%. Though the stated rationale for imposing higher 
taxes is to contain price rise and volatility, to generate revenue, and to increase 
transparency, these arguments are debatable and not much rooted in the available 
literature. In this context, we examine the relationship between trading activity, 
volatility and transaction cost using a three-equation structural model for five top 
selected commodities namely Gold, Copper, Petroleum Crude, Soya Oil and Chana 
(Chickpea). Results suggest that there exists a negative relationship between 
transaction cost and liquidity, and a positive relationship between transaction cost and 
volatility. Therefore, if the government imposes CTT, it would lead to higher 
volatility and lower trading activity affecting market efficiency and liquidity. 
However, agricultural commodities such as refined Soya oil and Chana are least 
affected in terms of volume and volatility in response to the imposition of transaction 
tax.  Increased volatility may lead to more speculative activity and fail to achieve the 
price discovery and resource allocation objectives of the commodity markets. Further, 
the granger causality results reveal the efficiency of futures markets but do not 
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IMPACT OF PROPOSED COMMODITY TRANSACTION TAX  







I.  Introduction 
 
A commodity exchange is defined as a market where multiple buyers and sellers trade 
commodity-linked contracts on the basis of terms and conditions laid down by the 
exchange (UNCTAD, 2007). Commodity exchanges offer spot trade for immediate 
delivery and forward contracts which result in future delivery
1. Since the commodity 
exchanges provide a forum for trading commodity-linked contracts, they reduce the 
transaction cost associated with finding a buyer or seller. Further, most importantly, 
the hedging and price discovery functions of future markets promote more efficient 
production planning, storage, marketing, rationalization of transaction costs & better 
margins for producers (Gilbert, 1985; Varangis and Larson 1996; Morgan, 1999; 
World Bank 1999). Since the inception of economic reforms in India in 1991, there 
have been efforts to open up futures trading in commodity markets which led to 
withdrawal of its prohibition in 2003. The volume of futures trade grew
2 
exponentially in agricultural commodities till 2005-06, but the trade in bullion and 
other metals has overtaken it since 2006-07.  
 
Participants of Commodity Exchange & Futures Market
3 can be broadly classified 
into investors, brokers, hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs. While a broker executes 
and facilitates trading, a hedger engages in the futures trading to protect himself 
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1 Commodity trading could be in the open-outcry mode whereby traders gather to auction lots of 
produce or it could be in electronic form. 
2  See Table-1 and Table-2 in Appendix at the end. All the tables are given in Appendix at end.  
3 In general, participants in the Commodity Exchange & Futures Market may include financial 
institutions, farmers, grain merchants, brokers, multinational corporations, food processors, and 
speculators.   2
against the risk of unfavourable price changes. However, the efficiency of the futures 
markets depends on the speculators who use liquid markets to move prices to get 
higher return and on the arbitrageurs who equalize prices across different markets for 
the same commodity by simultaneously trading to profit from a temporary 
discrepancy in prices across different exchanges.                
 
Economic Rationale for the Futures Market: Futures markets facilitate discovery 
of price expectations at a future date on the basis of information collected by many 
stake holders. Efficient functioning of future markets arguably results in many 
benefits for optimal decision making and resource allocation such as (i) Price 
Discovery–which is determined in this competitive market on the basis of estimated, 
current and future, supply and demand.  However, efficiency of price discovery 
depends on the continuous flow of information and transparency
4 (UNCTAD 2007). 
Price discovery in futures market guides producers to make decisions on the timing of 
trade and farmers in making cropping decisions etc. Overall, price discovery reduces 
the so-called “cobweb effect” of inter-seasonal price fluctuations. (ii)  Risk 
Reduction–futures markets allow market participants such as farmers, traders, 
processors etc to hedge their risk against price volatility by offering trade in 
commodity forwards, futures and options. The price discovery in futures markets, 
which facilitates in stabilizing prices of commodities, can potentially offset losses or 
price risk by hedging (Morgan, 2000). Hedging can bring greater certainty over the 
planting cycle, confidence to invest, adjust cropping patterns, diversify risk profile 
and opt for higher-risk but higher-revenue crops
5. (iii) Risk Sharing - future 
commodity markets allows for risk sharing among various market participants
6.  
Thus, overall, future markets promote more efficient production planning, storage, 
marketing and better margins for producers by providing a mechanism for risk 
management and price discovery (Gilbert, 1985; Varangis and Larson 1996;   Morgan 
1999; World Bank, 1999).  
                                                 
4 Factors such as natural calamities, political instability, climate change etc, can all have a major effect 
on supply and demand and, as a result, the present and future price of a commodity. 
5 See UNCATD, 2007 for details.  
6 For example, farmers can sell in futures to ensure remunerative prices. A manufacturing firm can buy 
in futures to hedge against volatile raw material costs. An exporter can commit to a price to his 
foreign clients. A stockist/supplier can hedge his carrying risk to ensure smooth prices of seasonal 
commodities round the year.   3
However, futures markets have also been criticized for several reasons namely (i) 
futures trading drives up prices as speculators use liquid market to manipulate prices
7, 
which works against the interest of growers and consumers; (ii) futures trading drives 
up volatility though the existing limited empirical evidence does not support this 
view
8 (Naik, 1970; Dasgupta, 2004); (iii) futures market is not transparent, though the 
transparency depends upon information symmetry and level of infrastructure.  
 
Government of India has proposed to impose transaction tax by 0.017% in the 2008-
09 budget almost increasing the total transaction cost by more than 950 percent (see 
Table-3). The stated rationale for imposing CTT is to contain price rise, volatility in 
future markets and to bring in more transparency. But this rationale is not much 
rooted from literature. Given the benefits of the futures markets as briefly discussed 
and the nascent stage of commodity exchange in India today, this study makes an 
attempt to assess the impact of proposed transaction tax on liquidity, volatility, prices 
and efficiency of commodity derivative markets in India. The findings of this paper, it 
is hoped, will also contribute to the general debate on the welfare implications of 
future commodity markets.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section-II describes the development of 
commodity futures market in India; Section-III explains the commodity transaction 
tax; Section-IV deals with the global experience with Commodity Transaction Tax 
(CTT); Section-V explains the methodology and empirical analysis of CTT on 
liquidity, volatility, prices and efficiency. Section-VI presents the conclusions and the 
policy implications. 
 
II.  Development of Commodity Futures Market in India 
 
India is one of the top producers of agricultural commodities and a major consumer of 
bullion and energy products. Given the importance of commodity production and 
consumption in India, it is necessary to develop the commodity markets with proper 
                                                 
7 For example, in case of some bad news about the future, the speculators start hoarding the 
commodities & hence, artificially drive up the prices. But in case of some negative news about 
future, the prices are going to go up irrespective of whether futures market is there or not.   
8  Contrary, Naik (1970) finds that the fluctuation in prices of commodities was higher when there were 
no futures trading as compared to prices when there were futures trading  
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regulatory mechanism for efficiency and optimal resource allocation.  In this section 
we review the growth and performance of commodity markets in India. 
 
Origin of Commodity market: The history of organized commodity futures market 
in India goes back to the nineteenth century when the cotton trade association started 
futures trading in 1875 followed by derivatives trading in oilseeds in Bombay (1900), 
raw jute and jute goods in Calcutta (1912), wheat in Hapur (1913) and bullion in 
Bombay (1920). However, many feared that derivatives fuelled unnecessary 
speculation and the Government of Bombay prohibited options business in cotton in 
1939. Further, forward trading was prohibited in oilseeds and some other 
commodities including food-grains, spices, vegetable oils, sugar and cloth in 1943. 
Post independence, the Indian constitution listed the subject of “Stock Exchanges and 
Futures Markets” under the union list and a legislation called Forward Contract Act 
1952 was enacted, on the basis of recommendations of the Shroff  Committee 
providing legal framework for organized forward trading. The first organized future 
trading was by the India Pepper and Spices Trade Association (IPSTA) in Cochin in 
1957. However, futures trade was prohibited in most of the commodities thereafter.  
Since then both the Dantawala Committee (1966) and the Khusro Committee (1980) 
have recommended the revival of futures trading in agricultural commodities
9.  
 
After the 1991 reforms, the Government set up a Committee in 1993 headed by Dr. 
K.N. Kabra to examine the role of futures trading. The committee recommended that 
futures trading in 17 commodities be permitted. Further, National Agricultural Policy 
(2000) and the expert committee on strengthening and developing Agricultural 
Marketing (2001, Guru Committee) supported commodity futures trading.  In 
February 2003, the government revoked the ban and accepted most of these 
recommendations allowing futures trading in 54 commodities in bullion and 
agricultural sectors. Responding positively to the favourable policy changes, several 
Nation-wide Multi-Commodity Exchanges (NMCE) were up since 2002, using 
                                                 
9 See the Report “The Impact of Future Trading on Agricultural Commodities”, 2008, for more on 
history of future trading in India. Now onwards Expert Committee Report, 2008 (EC, 2008). Brief 
Review of the EC report has been given in Appendix.    5
modern practices such as electronic trading and clearing. The Forward Markets 
Commission (FMC) regulates these exchanges
10.  
 
Structure of Commodity Market in India: Trading in commodity market takes 
place in two distinct forms such as the Over-The-Counter (OTC), which is basically 
spot market and the exchange-based market. Further, as in equities, there exists the 
spot where participation is restricted to people who are involved with that commodity, 
such as the farmer, processor, wholesaler, etc. and the derivatives segments where 
trading takes place through the exchange-based markets like equity derivatives.  
 
At present, there are 23 exchanges operating in India and carrying out futures trading 
activities in as many as 146 commodity items (see Fig-1). As per the recommendation 
of the FMC, the Government of India recognized the National Multi-Commodity 
Exchange (NMCE), Ahmedabad; Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX) and National 
Commodity and Derivative Exchange (NCDEX), Mumbai, as nation-wide multi-
commodity exchanges. NMCE commenced in November 2002 and MCX in 
November 2003 and NCDEX in December 2003. Unlike the stock markets, the 
commodity markets in India have a single product (only futures) and a single user
11 
(only traders including corporates).  
 
Growth of Commodity Futures Market: The volume of trade has increased 
exponentially since 2004-05 to reach Rs. 40.65 lakh crore in 2007-08.  Almost 95% of 
this is now accounted for by the two national exchanges viz., Mumbai (MCX), with 
around 75 % share and NCDEX, with 20 % share (see Figure-2). There are more then 
3000 members registered with the exchanges. More than 20,000 terminals spread over 
more than 800 towns/cities of the country provide access to the trading platforms (EC, 
2008). Gold, silver and petroleum crude recorded the highest turnover in MCX; while 
in NCDEX, soya oil, guar seed and soyabean was dominant; in NMCE, pepper, 
rubber and raw jute were the most actively traded commodities. Though in India, 
agricultural products dominate the commodity sectors, trading in non-agricultural 
                                                 
10 At present, there are three tiers of regulations of forward/futures trading system in India, viz., 
Government of India, Forward Markets Commission and Commodity Exchanges.  
11 The stock markets in India have options and indices meeting the needs of people with various risk 
taking ability.  Further, unlike in stock markets, commodity markets are not open to banks, mutual 
funds, and foreign institutional investors.     6
commodities has been dominating particularly, from 2006-07 onwards. The trading 
volumes of non-agricultural commodities have shot up almost twice that of 
agricultural commodities during the same period. Overall, the Indian commodity 
market has shown tremendous growth in terms of both value and the number of 
commodities traded in the last five years. As the largest commodity futures exchange 
during 2006-07, both in terms of turnover and number of contracts, the growth of 
MCX is comparable (see Figure-3) with some of the international commodity futures 
exchanges such as Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index (DJAIG) and Reuters/Jefferies 
Commodity Research Bureau (RJCRB). A comparative picture of the volume of trade 
in major commodity derivative market is reported in Table-4.  
 
Performance of Indian Commodity Derivatives Market: There are few empirical 
studies on the performance of Indian commodity derivatives market. A study by 
Lokare (2007) finds that although Indian commodity market is yet to achieve 
minimum critical liquidity in some commodities (sugar, peper, gur and groundnut), 
almost all the commodities show an evidence of co-integration between spot and 
future prices revealing the right direction of achieving improved operational 
efficiency,  albeit, at a slower pace. Further, hedging proves to be an effective 
proposition in respect of some commodities. However, in a few commodities, the 
volatility in the future price has been substantially lower than the spot price indicating 
an inefficient utilisation of information. Several commodities also appear to attract 
wide speculative trading. One of the reasons for low volumes could be attributed to 
some of the measures that FMC undertook in the recent period such as daily mark to 
market margining, time stamping of trades, demutualisation for the new exchanges, 
etc., with a view to promote market integrity and transparency. The exchanges have 
attributed subsequent fall in the volume of trade to introduction of these measures 
12(Kolamkar, 2003).  Thomas (2003) reports that major stumbling blocks in the 
development of derivatives market are the fragmented physical/spot markets. 
Supporting this view, Lokare (2007) suggests that national level derivative exchanges 
cannot be founded on fragmented localized cash markets. Because of fragmentation, 
prices of major commodities vary widely across Mandis. These differences arise 
                                                 
12 The exchanges like Bombay Commodity Exchange and Kanpur Commodity Exchange, which 
implemented most of these reforms, were literally deserted by all the traditional players (Kolamkar, 
2003).   7
because of poor grading; differential rates of taxes and levies, and inadequacy of 
storage facilities (Bhattacharya, 2007). Similarly, Raizada and Sahi (2007) found that 
commodity futures market is not efficient in the short-run and social loss statistics 
also indicate poor price discovery in the commodity market. Spot price leads the 
futures price determination and the futures markets are not performing their main role 
of price discovery. There were also doubts that the growth of commodity futures 
market volume has an impact on the inflation level in India. Though EC (2008) report 
does not find any conclusive evidence between futures trading in agricultural 
commodities and their price level.  The change in price level and volatility in top ten 
agricultural commodities are shown in fig-4 and fig-5. The analysis of the EC report 
does not show any clear evidence of either reduced or increased volatility of spot 
prices due to futures trading. Further, the fact that agricultural price inflation 
accelerated during the post futures period does not, however, necessarily mean that 
this was caused by futures trading. One reason for the acceleration of price increase in 
the post futures period was that the immediate pre-futures period had been one of the 
relatively low agricultural prices, reflecting an international downturn in commodity 
prices (see Appendix for Brief Review of EC Report, 2008).   
 
IV.  Commodity Transaction Tax in India 
 
The government has proposed to impose CTT in budget 2008-09 in line with the 
Securities Transaction Tax (STT) thereby bringing the futures market under the net of 
service tax. CTT shall be charged in respect of every taxable commodities transaction. 
The sale of an option in goods or an option in commodity derivative or sale of any 
other commodity derivative would attract 0.017% of CTT, which is payable by the 
seller and is calculated on the basis of option premium and selling price respectively. 
This entails a rise of total transaction cost from Rs. 2.00 per lakh to Rs. 19.25 per lakh 
– more than 950 percent increase on an average (see Table-3 and Table-5). Increase in 
CTT is contrary to the observation in the Economic Survey, 2007-08, “Direct 
participation of the framers in the commodity futures markets is somewhat difficult at 
this stage as the large lot size, daily margining, high membership fees etc., work as 
deterrent for framers’ participation in these markets” and the increase in CTT will 
further increase the cost
13.  Though Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee 
                                                 
13 There is also no evidence of imposition of CTT in other exchanges in the rest of the world.    8
(APMC) Act makes provision that no tax, cess or mandi fee is payable by the farmers, 
they will pay CTT as it is proposed to be levied on sellers. It implies that a farmer, 




Generally, commodity derivatives are based on global asset class and investors can 
choose between MCX, NCDEX, NMCE, or NYMEX (New York), CBOT (Chicago) 
TOCOM (Tokyo), SFE (Shanghai) for trading. Therefore, Indian commodity 
exchanges have to match the transaction costs applicable at their international peers to 
attract investors. Any increase in the transaction tax beyond the international level 
may drive the volume to international exchanges or unofficial dabbas. Hence, 
applying CTT means exporting our market to other global exchanges as CTT is not 
levied in these leading exchanges (Table-5). It is clear that the transaction cost for 
trading value of Rs. 1 lakh will be the highest in the world after the levy of CTT and 
service tax.  
 
CTT has been proposed on the lines of Securities Transaction Tax (STT), its levy 
should not affect commodity futures market like STT (Sahu, 2008). However, equity 
markets in India are mature and large in size compared to commodity futures market. 
Further, the basic purpose of commodity market is hedging against price risk which is 
considered as an insurance instrument (World Bank, 1996). Therefore, CTT is simply 
a tax on insurance policy, thereby sending a negative signal to the potential hedgers 
insuring against price risk. The difference between stock market and commodity 
derivative market is summed up in table-5.  
 
The Argument for CTT: The rationale for levying CTT may have been guided by 
the following argument. (i) generating revenue- one of the motives for levying CTT is 
to generate tax revenues. However, actual realization of revenue from CTT may not 
be significant if the volume of trading falls in response to the CTT. Further, traders 
may migrate their investment to foreign exchanges in order to seek lower transaction 
tax and retain profit (Umlauf, 1993). (ii) tracking information for better tax 
                                                 
14 Some of exchanges also claim that the commodity before it comes for trading in commodity 
exchanges is already charged to the tune of almost 12 per cent with taxes such as mandi tax, the cess, 
the handling cost and warehousing charges. 
   9
compliance: CTT may have been designed as an anti-evasion measure. But, all 
national commodity exchanges have world class surveillance systems with proper 
auditing and are regulated by FMC.  Hence, tracking is always possible even without 
imposition of CTT. (iii) reducing excess volatility: proponents believe that the 
transaction tax could act as a fundamental function to reduce excess volatility by 
reducing noise trading. However, there is also the possibility that increase in 
transaction tax may not necessarily check price volatility (see Roll, 1989; Kupiec, 
1991; Grundfest and Shovel, 1990).  
 
IV.  Impact of Transaction Tax: Global Experience 
 
There have been considerable debates on the costs and benefits of imposing 
transaction taxes on the securities and derivatives markets. In general, proponents of a 
transaction tax argue that it would generate revenues (see Kiefer, 1990) and 
discourage speculative trading. Transaction taxes can also help reduce noise trading, a 
significant source of price fluctuations, and hence decrease the return volatility (see 
Stiglitz, 1989; Summer and Summer, 1989). 
 
Opponents argue that the benefits of a transaction tax are likely to be outweighed by 
its potential costs, because it would increase the cost of capital (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1993), reduce market liquidity (i.e., decrease in trading volume and 
increase in bid-ask spreads), not necessarily reduce excess price volatility (Kupiec, 
1991; Grundfest and Shoven, 1990), and bring down securities’ values (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1990). Recently, Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2003) developed a 
theoretical model showing that fixed transactions costs would induce large “no-trade” 
regions, decrease securities’ liquidity and result in a significant illiquidity discount in 
asset prices.  
 
Edwards (1993) examines the rationale for extending tax on security markets futures 
to commodity markets futures in the USA and analyzes the potential effect. His 
findings reveal that tax on futures market will not generate substantial tax revenues 
and it will increase bid-ask spread and may shift trading volume to overseas markets 
weakening the international competitiveness of US futures markets. Further, a 
transaction tax would generate indirect costs for hedgers as they need to pay higher 
risk premiums to speculators due to the reduction in trading volume.    10
 
On the effect of transaction tax on trading volume, Ericssion and Lindgren (1992) 
analyze the cross-sectional data for twenty three exchanges in twenty two countries. 
They find that an increase in the transaction tax would reduce average turnover 
(measured as trading volume/shares outstanding). Wang and Yau (1994) examine the 
relations between trading volume, bid ask spread, and price volatility in four US 
futures markets. Inferring that a transaction tax would have the same effects as wider 
bid-ask spreads, they find that such a tax will reduce trading volume, increase price 
volatility and generate moderate increase in tax revenues. Baltagi et al. (2006) find 
that an increase in the Chinese stamp tax rate by 0.2 percentage points reduces the 
trading volume by one third. 
 
Roll (1989) examines whether countries with transaction taxes have a lower volatility, 
and finds the answer to be negative. Similarly, Umlauf (1993) finds that the 
introduction of, or increase in, the Swedish transaction tax would lead to an increase 
in stock market price volatility. Examining the effect of changes in transaction taxes 
in four Asian countries, Hu (1998) finds insignificant impact of transaction taxes on 
price volatility, but significant negative impact on stock returns in some countries. 
Saporta and Kan (1997) investigate the effect of the UK stamp duty on the volatility 
of continuously compounded 15-minute returns over daily, weekly and monthly time 
periods. The results reveal that there is no evidence of any kind of effect, positive or 
negative, on the volatility. 
  
There is also empirical evidence that imposition of /increase in STT would decrease 
return. Hu (1998) finds that upon the announcement of the tax, the average return fell 
1.57 per cent in Taiwan and by 0.55 per cent in Korea. Umlauf (1993) estimates that 
the Swedish All-Share equity index fell 2.2 per cent when the 1 per cent tax was 
announced in 1983 and by 0.8 per cent when the tax rate was increased in 1986. In the 
UK, Saporta and Kan (1997) report that the equity index declined by 3.33 per cent on 
the announcement of an increase in stamp duty rate from 1 per cent to 2 per cent. 
When the stamp duty was decreased from 2 per cent to 1 per cent and then from 1 per 
cent to 0.5 per cent, the index increased by 0.558 per cent and 1.054 per cent 
respectively. 
   11
Potential revenue and ease of collection from imposition of a transaction tax are 
attractive to governments. However, Umlauf (1993) reports that the decreased levels 
of trading in response to transaction tax resulted in decreased capital gains revenue in 
Sweden. Table 7 presents an international comparison of direct revenues from 
transaction taxes in the mid 1980s. The table includes a wide range of seemingly 
contradictory entries. Switzerland, with a tax rate not much different from that of 
Germany, raised twelve times as much revenue in relation to the size of the economy. 
Italy, with a relatively low tax rate, generates an impressive amount of revenue. The 
UK tax, which also brings in an ample amount of revenue, taxes away 0.01% of the 
market value of equity, far out of line with the tax in other countries, such as 
Germany, that raise less revenue. Recently, a study by Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller, 
and Picek (2007) estimates the transaction tax revenue of different countries. It is seen 
that the revenue from transaction tax varies between 0.01 for France to 1.7 for Spain, 
depending on the tax rate (see Table 8). 
 
Chou and Lee (2002) provide interesting empirical evidence on the effect of the 
transaction tax on liquidity and market efficiency. They demonstrate that after the tax 
reduction on the Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX), the TAIFEX assumed a 
leading role over the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) in the price discovery process 
for the index futures contracts.  Supporting Chou and Lee, Hsieh (2004) also notes 
that the information advantage of SGX has diminished as the TAIFEX lowered its 
transaction tax. Finally, in a review article by Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003), they 
conclude that transactions taxes have a significant impact on the transformation of 
investor demands into transactions. Transaction taxes are found to delay the price 
discovery process, increase volatility, and reduce market liquidity. 
 
Using futures market data, Aliber et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between 
transaction costs and volatility  and a negative relation between trading volume and 
transaction cost in the foreign exchange futures market for the British Pound, 
Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc (against the U.S. Dollar). Constantinides (1986) and 
Hegde and Miller (1989) show that increases in transaction costs cause investors to 
reduce the frequency and volume of trading. Another study by Aitken, Duffy and 
Frino (194) documents a decrease in trading activity by 15% due to increase in 
transaction fee by $1 per contract for the case of Austria. Similarly, Chou and Wang   12
(2005) found that following the reduction in transaction tax, the trading volume had 
increased and the bid-ask spread had decreased.   
 
Futures Market and Inflation: Empirical literature on Futures Market and inflation 
compare spot market volatility before and after the introduction of futures trading and 
investigate the impact of futures activity on spot volatilities.  Kamara (1982) finds that 
the introduction of commodity futures trading generally reduced or at least did not 
increase the cash price volatility. Further, Singh (2000) investigated the hessian cash 
(spot) price variability, before and after the introduction of futures trading (1988-
1997) in Indian markets using the multiplicative dummy variable model and 
concluded that futures trading had reduced the price volatility in the hessian cash 
market. However, Yang et al. (2005) showed that an unexpected and unidirectional 
increase in futures trading volume drove up the cash price volatility.  
 
On the other hand, the study by Nitesh (2005) reveals that futures trading in soya oil 
futures was effective in reducing the seasonal price volatilities, but not the daily price 
volatilities in India. Similarly, Sahi (2006) finds that the nature of volatility did not 
change with the introduction of futures trading in wheat, turmeric, sugar, cotton, raw 
jute and soya oil. Nevertheless, a weak destabilizing effect of futures on spot prices 
was found in case of wheat and raw jute. Further, the results of granger causality tests 
indicated that the unexpected increase in futures activity in terms of rise in volumes 
and open interest caused an increase in the cash price volatilities in all the 
commodities listed. Nath and Reddy (2007) find that futures activity leads to price 
volatilities in the case of urad dal but not in the case of gram and wheat. Therefore, 
the study concludes that the belief that futures trading contributes to rise in inflation 
(WPI) appears to have no merit in the present context.  
 
A study by the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore (IIMB) in 2008 explains 
that changes in fundamentals (mainly from the supply side) along with government 
policies were causing higher post-futures price rise and the role of futures trading 
remained unclear. EC (2008) while analyzing the impact of futures trading on 
commodity prices found that out of 21 commodities, price volatility increased in 10 
commodities, remained unchanged in two, and declined in 9, after the introduction of   13
futures trading
15. However, the committee could not find any strong conclusion on 
whether introduction of futures trade is associated with decrease or increase in spot 
price volatility. Looking at price growth and price volatility of top ten agricultural 
commodities consisting major future trade, it is not clear whether future trading 
contributes to price rise or price volatility.  
 
Migration to Overseas Market:  Empirical evidence (Umlauf 1993; Edwards 1993; 
Habermeier, and Kirilenko 2003) suggests that when a government levies or increases 
transaction tax on local markets, investors shift their trading to overseas markets. For 
example, the Euro-dollar market developed in response to American government’s 
attempts to control capital exports and place other regulations on the banking system. 
Euro-dollar market grew from US $20 billion in 1964 to over US $3 trillion in gross 
size by 1988. Switzerland, a world banking centre, also suffered from financial 
migration. Its stamp duty also caused the mutual fund business to migrate to 
Luxembourg and the Eurobond and equity business to go to London. By 1993, 22% of 
trading in Swiss companies was taking place in London, up from 16% only two years 
earlier. In 1993, the Swiss government abolished the 15% stamp duty on a wide 
variety of securities to stem such migration. 
 
The impact of transaction tax on the location of financial transactions was also felt in 
Germany and France. In 1989, before the elimination of Germany’s taxes, 30% of 
trading in German government bonds and 50% of trades in other DM-denominated 
bonds took place in London. Moreover, about one-third of the trading in French and 
German public companies took place in London, where almost one-half of the daily 
volume of trade is in shares of foreign companies. In the case of Sweden, Umlauf 
(1993) reports that when the STT was increased to 2 per cent in 1986, 60 per cent of 
the trading volume of the 11 most actively traded Swedish share classes migrated to 
London, where there was no transaction tax. This was equal to 30 per cent of the total 
trading volume. By 1990, the volume had increased to 50 per cent. 
 
V.  Empirical Methodology  
 
Following Aliber, Chowdhry and Yan (2003) and Chou and Wang (2005), we 
examine the effects of transaction costs, due to imposition of CTT, on volatility and 
                                                 
15 See Fig-5 and Fig-6 for top ten commodities taken out these 21 commodities.   14
volume of trading. Following previous empirical literature and assuming that 
imposition of CTT would increase the transaction cost which is proxied by the bid-ask 
spread, we estimate the relationship between trading volume, volatility and 
transaction cost in commodity futures market
16 in a three-equation structural model 
framework. The empirical structural model is specified as follows: 
 
          IVt = a1+ b11 BASt + b12 TVt + b13 IVt-1 + b14 VSPt + e1t       ……….…    (1) 
 
          TVt = a2+ b21 BASt + b22 IVt + b23 TVt-1 + b24 OIt + e2t            ………….    (2) 
           
          BASt = a3+ b13 BASt-1 + b23 IVt + b33 TV +  e3t      ………….   (3) 
 
Where IV









t r      ..………….(4) 
 
Where rt is the return series calculated as log (Pt/Pt-1). Pt is the future price at period t 
and Pt-1 is the future price at period t-1. nit is the number of trading days. TVt is the 
trading volume of the futures market on the t
th day and BASt is the intraday effective 
bid-ask spreads on the ith day. Effective Bid-Ask spread is defined as BASt = (Ask–
Bid)/ (Bid + Ask). OIt is the open interest and VSPt is the spot price volatility defined 
in equation-4. IVt is intraday price volatility on the t
th day.  
 
In equation 1, volatility in future price (IVt) is a function of trading volume in futures 
contracts (TVt), the effective bid-ask spread (BAS
t), the lagged volatility (IVt-1) and the 
Spot Price Volatility (VSPt). Admati and Pfleider (1990) argue that the informed 
traders are more likely to trade than the liquidity traders
17 (who bring volume to the 
market). This suggests that higher volume in futures will lead to higher volatility, and 
hence, there exists a simultaneity relationship between volatility and volume. 
Similarly, Aliber et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between transaction costs 
(BASt) and volatility for foreign exchange market. In equation 2, trading in futures 
                                                 
16 The trading volume and trading volatility is calculated for five commodities traded in MCX, which is 
the major commodity exchange market. 
17 They are mostly speculators.    15
contract (TVt) is modeled as a function of the effective bid-ask spread (BASt), price 
volatility (IVt), lagged trading volume (TV t-1) and open interest (OIt).  
 
The bid-ask spread represents a major component of the transaction cost, which is 
expected to have an adverse impact on the trading volume. Higher transaction cost 
would reduce the opportunity for market participants to make profitable trades, 
thereby forcing them to search for alternative trading vehicles with lower transaction 
cost. Hence, trading volume is expected to be negatively related to the size of the bid-
ask spread (Constantinides, 1986; Hegde and Miller, 1989; Aliber et al., 2003). Open 
interest is the total number of outstanding futures contracts. It is expected to a have a 
positive impact on trading volume because higher open interest generates more 
trading volume.  
 
Following prior research, Aitken and Frino (1994) argue, that an increase in the price 
volatility of a security causes market participants to place larger bid-ask spread, 
owing to increased information risk, whilst higher trading activity causes narrower 
spreads, as the waiting time to trade decreases. This further suggests a third equation 
which models transaction costs (bid-ask spread) in appropriate order, to properly 
catch the simultaneity in the relationship between transaction costs, volatility and 
trading activity. 
 
At this point, a note on the lagged variables in equations (1), (2) and (3) (i.e., TVt-1, 
BASt-1,  and IVt-1) is warranted. A partial adjustment model is specified in each 
equation to take into account the distributed lag (persistence) effect in the dependent 
endogenous variable. Thus, the lagged term of the dependent endogenous variable in 
each equation is entered as an explanatory variable in the model.  
 
To take account of the potential simultaneous equation bias, we use the Two Stage 
Least Square Method (2SLS) to correct endogeneity problem. Lag of independent and 
exogenous variables are used as instruments. Number of instruments used is equal or 
more than independent variables in each equation.  All three equations in the system 
developed above are exactly identified. Then, to avoid any spurious relationship 
among the variables due to the presence of a unit root in the time series, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) is applied to test for stationarity.    16
Data Source: The intraday and daily futures data on spot price, future price, bid-ask 
quotes, trading volume, and open interest are obtained from the Multi-Commodity 
Exchange (MCX). For the purpose of our study, we select five commodities mostly 
traded from four commodity categories namely, Gold from precious metals, Copper 
from basic metals, Petroleum Crude from energy, Refined Soya Oil and Chana (Chick 
pea) from agricultural commodities. The share of five commodities together in MCX 
total trading and in respective total (five commodities together) in all commodity 
exchanges are around 63% and 88 % respectively. All these commodities selected are 
in the top ten traded commodities in the MCX. The sample period covers May 1, 2006 
to April 30, 2008. 
 
Result Analysis: The empirical results of the ADF tests are reported in Table-10. We 
find that the time series of trading volume, bid-ask spreads, price volatility (future and 
spot) and open interest are stationary at level. Based on these results, we estimate our 
three-equation model in the level form for all variables. The results reveal that there 
exists a negative relationship between bid-ask spread (transaction cost) and trading 
volume. The negative and significant coefficient of the transaction cost variable 
suggests that increase in transaction costs causes a decrease in trading activity. 
Results for five commodities are reported below in Table-I to Table-V.  
 
The coefficient of the daily realized price volatility (IVt) is positive and statistically 
significant for all except Chana. This result is expected and consistent with the 
empirical findings of Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) and 
Wang, Yau and Baptiste (1997) and Chou and Wang (2005). In addition, the result is 
consistent with the theory that an increase in price volatility changes the reserve price 
of speculators and increases the demand for risk-transfer by hedgers. Both effects are 
presumed to lead to a higher trading volume.  The coefficient of open interest (OIt) is 
positive and statistically significant for all except Chana, indicating that an increase in 
open interest will result in an increase in trading volume, a result that is consistent 
with our expectation. 
 
The empirical estimates of volatility equation indicate that the coefficients for both 
trading volume (TVt) and bid-ask spreads (BASt) are positive and significant. From the 
estimated price volatility equation, we can trace the sources of change in the observed   17
price volatility into two components: (1) the information component approximated by 
trading volume (TVt) and (2) the intraday liquidity component represented by the bid-
ask spreads (BASt). 
 
It is interesting to note that the coefficient of spot price volatility (VSPt) is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. Current physical volatility is included in the model as 
there is an arbitrage relationship between the future price and the spot price (Siegel 
and Siegel, 1990). It is often argued that derivatives market attracts informed traders 
who cause market activity in the derivative market to lead that in the physical 
commodity markets. 
 
In the bid-ask spread equation, the coefficient of trading volume (TVt) is negative and 
statistically significant. This result is consistent with those of Wang and You (2000) 
and Chou and Wang (2005). The coefficient of price volatility (IVt) is significantly 
positive. An increase in price volatility implies higher risk for the market maker, as 
mentioned previously. The coefficient of the lagged bid-ask spreads (BASt-1) is 
statistically significant. Therefore, this result supports our specification of partial 
adjustment in the bid-ask equation. 
 
Table I: Empirical results on trading volume, bid-ask spreads and price volatility 
of Gold Futures  
 
Variable   TVt IVt BASt 
Constant  14.45** (3.59)  0.017 (0.54)  0.009** (15.34) 
TVt    0.001# (1.68)  -0.001** (-6.31) 
TV t-1 0.14**  (3.09)     
IVt  32.61** (4.95)    0.006** (7.29) 
IVt-1      0.35** (8.92)   
OIt 0.55#  (1.76)     
BASt  -619.88** (-6.38)  9.48** (5.50)   
BASt-1     0.08  (1.22) 
VSPt   0.16**  (4.47)   
R
2 0.26 0.29 0.24 
 
Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. **, * and # denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.    18
Table II: Empirical results on trading volume, bid-ask spreads and price 
volatility of Crude Futures 
 
Variable TVt IVt BASt 
Constant  5.47* (1.98)  -0.03 (-0.73)  0.018** (14.10) 
TVt    0.04** (5.90)  -0.001** (-7.75) 
TV t-1 0.28**  (6.26)     
IVt  21.02** (3.18)    0.015** (8.54) 
IVt-1      0.26** (7.28)   
OIt 1.52**  (6.68)     
BASt  -367.32** (-4.17)  9.99** (8.58)   
BASt-1     0.16**  (4.34) 
VSPt   0.09**  (2.99)   
R
2 0.37 0.27 0.39 
 
Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. **, and * denote significance at the 1% , and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table III: Empirical results on trading volume, bid-ask spreads and price 
volatility of Copper Futures 
 
Variable   TVt IVt BASt 
Constant  23.01** (4.84)  -0.25** (-4.42)  0.016** (8.80) 
TVt    0.006** (7.46)  -0.002** (-4.67) 
TV t-1 0.24**  (6.47)     
IVt  14.64** (5.83)    0.005** (7.54) 
IVt-1      0.32** (9.43)   
OIt 0.65**  (3.21)     
BASt  -412.95** (-4.12)  17.47** (7.38)   
BASt-1     0.25**  (5.86) 
VSPt   0.23**  (8.05)   
R
2 0.31 0.38 0.38 
 
Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. ** , and  *  denote significance at the 1% , and 
5%  levels, respectively. 
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Table IV: Empirical results on trading volume, bid-ask spreads and price 
volatility of Ref Soya Oil Futures 
 
Variable   TVt IVt BASt 
Constant  0.17 (1.52)  -0.02 (-0.73)  0.020** (7.18) 
TVt    0.05** (4.26)  -0.012** (-6.41) 
TV t-1 0.35**  (9.15)     
IVt  0.78** (3.14)    0.05** (4.62) 
IVt-1      0.15** (4.61)   
OIt 0.41**  (7.54)     
BASt  -5.04** (-4.30)  0.99* (2.80)   
BASt-1     -0.12*  (2.81) 
VSPt    0.78** (17. 3)   
R
2 0.43 0.51 0.18 
 
Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. ** , and  * denote significance at the 1% , and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table V: Empirical results on trading volume, bid-ask spreads and price 
volatility of Chana Futures 
 
Variable   TVt IVt BASt 
Constant  0.11** (3.16)  -0.04(-0.62)   -0.07 (-3.34) 
TVt   0.23*  (2.45)  -0.12**(3.21) 
TV t-1 0.60**  (16.63)     
IVt  0.05 (0.85)    0.12* (2.21) 
IVt-1      0.28** (7.62)   
OIt 0.11  (1.07)     
BASt  -0.20* (2.41)  0.17* (2.13)  1.36** (21.35) 
BASt-1      
VSPt   0.50**  (11.54)   
R
2 0.42    0.35 0.27 
 
Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics. **, and * denote significance at the 1%, and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Simulation Results: Having seen the basic relationship among the variables, we 
simulate the results of the imposition of CTT on the commodity futures market.  As 
previously mentioned, Aitken, Duffy and Frino (1994) and Chou and Wang (2005), 
explain that when CTT is imposed, the transaction cost (bid-ask spread) would 
increase at least by that much percentage
18. So, we give external shocks to the bid-ask 
spread in equation-1 and equation-2 to derive the simulation results. We have three 
alternative scenarios. First, we assume that when 0.0125% of CTT is imposed
19, the 
                                                 
18 The increase in cost may be more than the CTT due to increase in other costs.  
19 Recently it has been reported in print media that government is planning to impose CTT between 
0.125 to 0.017%.    20
transaction cost is increased by 0.0125% (scenario-1). Second, we assume that with 
the imposition of 0.017% tax, the transaction cost is increased by 0.17% (scenario-2). 
Third, we assume that with the imposition of 0.017% tax, the transaction cost is 
increased by 0.17% (scenario-3).The simulation results of trading volume and daily 
volatility because of imposition of CTT for five commodities are presented in Table-
VI (also see simulations from fig-6 to fig-15). It is clear that with the increase in 
transaction tax by 0.0125%, trading volume will decrease for all commodities within 
the range starting from 24.34% for Gold, to minimum 2.22% for Chana. As a result, it 
will have a negative impact on the market efficiency. Similarly, daily volatility will 
increase  within the range starting from 26.24% for gold to minimum 2.16% for 
Chana. Therefore, if the government imposes the transaction tax of 0.017%, liquidity 
of the commodity futures market will decrease and volatility will increase. The 
negative impact on trading volumes and positive impact on volatility increase in case 
of scenario-2 and scenario-3 when transaction cost increases by 0.017% and 0.02% 
respectively due to imposition of CTT. 
 
Table VI: Simulated Result of the Impact of Increase in Transaction Tax on 
Liquidity and Volatility 
 
Trading Volume  Volatility 












Gold -24.34  -31.93  -37.71  26.24  31.25  34.5 
Crude  -16.43  -24.62  -27.31  20.22 25.63 30.13 
Copper  -17.33  -24.79  -29.82  13.56 19.54 24.76 
Ref Soya 
Oil  -5.42  -6.23  -7.27  4.35 6.16 7.87 
Chana -2.22 -3.25  -4.75  2.16  3.71  4.58 
 
Notes: In scenario 1, transaction cost increases by 0.0125%, in scenario 2, transaction cost 
increases by 0.017% and in scenario 3, transaction cost increases by 0.02%.  
 
Futures Price and Inflation:  The functioning of futures markets came under 
scrutiny during 2006-07 and the government ordered delisting of futures contracts in 
agricultural commodities like urad, tur, wheat and rice in early 2007, on the suspicion 
that futures trading in these commodities had been contributing to the rise in spot 
prices. Similarly, the Government of India banned futures trading in chana, potato and 
soya oil in May 2008, in an attempt to contain the price rise in essential commodities 
and curb the spiraling inflation rate in the country. In this section, we present evidence   21
about the role of futures market in inflation by carrying out Granger causality test 
between trading volume and spot prices for five commodities. It has been argued, that 
futures trading in commodities leads to higher inflation as speculators drive the prices 
up beyond the fundamental value. If trading volume leads the spot price, then it is 
assumed that inflation is caused by futures trading. On the other hand, if spot price 
causes futures price, there is no evidence against future market leading to higher 
inflation. 
 
Given that our price series are stationary, we use granger causality test to examine 
whether futures trading influences spot prices. The granger causality test is carried out 
at levels and the results are presented in Table-VII. Results show that out of five 
commodities, we have only one case (crude) where causality runs from volume to 
spot prices. All other four cases, there is no causality from volume to spot prices. 
Therefore, we do not have sufficient evidence to support that futures market leads to 
higher inflation. 
 
Table VII: Granger Causality between volume of trading and Spot Prices 
 
Commodity  Null Hypothesis   F-Statistics  P-value 
Volume does not Granger Cause Spot 
Price  0.87 0.58 
Gold 
Spot Price does not Granger Cause 
Volume  3.44** 0.001 
Volume does not Granger Cause Spot 
Price  2.43* 0.04 
Crude 
Spot Price does not Granger Cause 
Volume  2.87* 0.02 
Volume does not Granger Cause Spot 
Price  1.13 0.34 
Copper 
Spot Price does not Granger Cause 
Volume  0.89 0.49 
Volume does not Granger Cause Spot 
Price  0.67 0.71 
Ref Soya Oil 
Spot Price does not Granger Cause 
Volume  3.17* 0.02 
Volume does not Granger Cause Spot 
Price  0.57 0.79 
Chana 
Spot Price does not Granger Cause 
Volume  0.96 0.46 
 
** denotes the rejection of Null hypothesis at 1% level, * denotes the rejection of Null 
hypothesis at 5% level. Optimal lag length is selected o the basis of AIC Criterion.   22
Futures Trading volume and Spot price: Having found inconclusive evidence 
regarding whether futures trading granger causes spot prices, we proceed further to 
examine the efficiency through price discovery mechanism by doing causality 
analysis between future prices and spot prices. Since both spot and future return series 
are I (0), we carry out granger causality at levels. The results (Table-VIII) reveal that 
in all five commodities future prices ganger cause spot prices. Previous literature also 
suggests that when there is causality running from future return series to spot return 
series, the market is efficient. This implies that the commodity futures market is 
efficient for the five commodities. 
 
Table VIII: Granger Causality between Future Prices and Spot Prices 
 
Commodity  Null Hypothesis   F-Statistics  P-value 
Spot does not Granger Cause 
Future  1.66  0.14 
Gold  
Future does not Granger Cause 
Spot  117.56**  0.00 
Spot does not Granger Cause 
Future  0.721  0.66 
Crude 
Future does not Granger Cause 
Spot  125.34**  0.00 
Spot does not Granger Cause 
Future  1.48 0.11 
Copper 
Future does not Granger Cause 
Spot  380.43** 0.00 
Spot does not Granger Cause 
Future  2.51* 0.02 
Ref Soya Oil 
Future does not Granger Cause 
Spot  7.96** 0.00 
Spot does not Granger Cause 
Future  1.82* 0.05 
Chana 
Future does not Granger Cause 
Spot  5.38** 0.00 
 
** and * denotes the rejection of Null hypothesis at 1 % and 5% level respectively. Optimal 
lag length is selected o the basis of AIC Criterion. 
 
Cointegration and causality test results indicate that there exists a cointegrating 
relationship between future prices and spot prices for all commodities. Results from 
causality test indicate as follows: (1) Trading volume does not granger cause Spot 
price in four commodities except Crude; (2) Future price granger causes spot price for   23
all the commodities. There, we don’t find the enough evidence to conclude that 
futures trading causes inflation. Further, the futures markets are efficient.  
 
VI:  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Commodity derivatives and futures are instruments to achieve price discovery and 
price risk management. After withdrawal of prohibition on futures trading in 2003, the 
volume of futures trade increased exponentially in agricultural commodities till 2005-
06 but the trade in Bullion and other metals over took it in 2006-07. Overall, Non-
agricultural commodities have been dominating the futures markets in India. 
International experience shows decrease in trading volume due to either increase or 
imposition of security transaction tax. Further, we do not find any commodity 
transaction tax in other major commodity futures trading markets. After imposition of 
tax by 0.17%, transaction cost would increase substantially and may be highest in 
world. 
 
The empirical results for five top selected commodities namely Gold, Copper, Crude, 
Soya Oil and Chana suggest that there exists a negative relationship between 
transaction cost and trading volume, and a positive relationship between transaction 
cost and volatility. Therefore, any increase in transaction cost would lead to lower 
trading activity and higher volatility. Having seen the basic relationship among the 
variables, we simulated the variables because of increase in transaction cost due to 
imposition of CTT by the amount of 0.0125%, 0.017% and 0.02%. It is clear that with 
the increase in transaction tax by 0.0125%, trading volume will decrease for all 
commodities within the range starting from 24.34% for copper, to minimum 2.22% 
for Chana. As a result, it will have negative impact on the market efficiency. 
Similarly, daily volatility will increase  within the range starting from 26.24% for 
gold, to minimum 2.16% for Chana. The negative impact on trading volumes and 
positive impact on volatility increases in case of higher transaction cost due to 
imposition of CTT by 0.017% and 0.02% respectively. Increased volatility may also 
lead to more speculative activities and fail to achieve price discovery and resource 
allocation objectives of the commodity markets. However, agricultural commodities 
such as refined Soya oil and Chana are least affected in terms of volume and volatility 
in response to the imposition of transaction tax. This may be due to fact that   24
agricultural commodities are traded domestically, while the other three products are 
traded internationally.  Also, the forward trades in agricultural commodities are for 
very short periods, whereas for the other three commodities, forward trades are for 
distant periods.  
 
The issue of future trading leading to inflation is examined by using granger causality 
between futures trading and spot prices. Results show that out of five commodities, 
we have only one case (crude), where causality runs from volume to spot prices. In 
the other four cases, there is no causality from volume to spot prices. Therefore, we 
do not have sufficient evidence to support that futures market leads to higher inflation. 
Further, the cointegration and causality analysis results support that futures markets 
for these five commodities are efficient. Any increase in transaction tax, as proposed, 
would increase the transaction cost and may keep farmers and hedgers out of the 
market, an outcome which would fail to achieve the objectives of commodity futures 
markets.  However, this is an exploratory study examining the impact of CTT on 
certain dimensions such as trading volume and volatility for five commodities in one 
exchange. The results need to be established by further research on larger commodity 
base and exchanges in a comprehensive manner.   25
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Appendix 
 
Brief Review of the report “The Impact of Future Trading on Agricultural 
Commodities”, 2008. 
 
The expert committee headed by Prof Abhijit Sen has been set up by government of 
India to (i) study the extent of impact, if any, of futures trading on wholesale and 
retail prices of agricultural commodities and to suggest ways to minimize such an 
impact; (ii) make such other recommendations as the Committee may consider 
appropriate regarding increased association of farmers in the futures market/trading so 
that farmers are able to get the benefit of price discovery through Commodity 
Exchanges. 
 
Findings and Explanations 
 
1.  There has been an exponential growth in futures trading after complete 
liberalization of industry in 2003 and with the setting up of three national level 
exchanges. Agricultural commodities constituted a significant proportion of 
total value of trade till 2005-06. This place was taken over by Bullion and 
other Metals in 2006-07.  Further, there has been a gradual fall in agri-
commodity volumes during 2007-08 over the previous year. Negative 
sentiments have been created by the decision to de-list futures trade in some 
important agricultural commodities.  
2.  The fact that agricultural price inflation accelerated during the post futures 
period does not, however, necessarily mean that this was caused by futures 
trading. One reason for the acceleration of price increase in the post futures 
period was that the immediate pre-futures period had been one of relatively 
low agricultural prices, reflecting an international downturn in commodity 
prices.  A part of the acceleration in the post futures period may be due to 
rebound/recovery of the past trend.  The period during which futures trading 
has been in operation is too short to discriminate adequately between the effect 
of opening up of futures markets and what might simply be the normal 
cyclical adjustment. 
3.  Indian data analysed in the report does not show any clear evidence of either 
reduced or increased volatility of spot prices due to futures trading. In contrast   30
to the view that futures markets cause increases in prices, the bulk of the 
existing literature on the subject emphasizes that such markets help in price 
discovery, provide price risk management and also bring about spatial and 
temporal integration of markets. Futures markets have the potential to bring 
about better price stability over a medium to long term, although, the literature 
on futures markets itself is rather divided on the subject of price variability.   
4.  Although the volume of futures trading in India has increased phenomenally in 
recent years, its ability to provide instruments of risk management has not 
grown correspondingly, and has in fact been quite poor.  The reason for this is 
high basis risk in most contracts which keeps out potential hedgers and lends 
to greater dominance by speculators.  This is a serious area which should be 
addressed by both, the exchanges and the regulator. 
5.  There is no indication of any unambiguous direction of impact of causality 
between futures and spot prices. For some commodities, post futures price 
inflation appears to have accelerated, while for some, it has slowed down. 
Similarly, the direction of causality also does not emerge in an unambiguous 
manner. It must also be kept in mind that this behaviour in the spot market is 
also subject to significant influence of supply factors. 
6.  With progressive opening up of the economy including trade in agricultural 
commodities, Indian markets cannot be insulated from global factors. It is 
illogical to argue that futures markets are a channel for global factors to 
influence the domestic spot markets. In an open economy, global supply-
demand related factors will impact on the domestic markets whether futures 
trading are permitted or not. There are of course weaknesses in the functioning 
of the futures market, but it needs improvement rather than banning. 
 
Policy Recommendations  
 
1.  The proposed FC(R) Amendment Bill to upgrade the regulation and to 
improve the capabilities of the regulator need to be pursued vigorously. 
2.  Exchanges should act as self regulatory organizations capable of administering 
fair play, objectivity and customer orientation. 
3.  There should be a consultative group both in FMC, as well as in the exchanges 
comprising persons with proven domain knowledge of commodity sector.   31
4.  At the apex level, a Committee on Commodity market, akin to the HLCC in 
the Capital Market, should be constituted with Deputy Chairman, Planning 
Commission or one of the Members of the Planning Commission as its 
nominee Chairman. 
5.  Collections from the transaction tax, if and when imposed on futures markets, 
should be earmarked exclusively for development of the required physical 
market infrastructure and to improve farmers’ access to it. 
6.  Conditions should be created so that farmers can use agri futures market to 
transfer their price risks. The contract designs should be tailored to meet the 
needs of the physical market. 
7.  Efficient functioning of futures markets pre-supposes the existence of efficient 
spot markets.  Reforming spot market should also be a top priority.   
8.  Setting up of national spot electronic exchanges by the national commodity 
exchanges is an attempt to create a national integrated market.  National 
integration of the markets should be promoted. 
9.  Model APMC Act - operationalizing the same by appropriate set of rules and 
regulations needs to be expedited. 
10.  Banks and Financial Institutions which are at present not permitted to trade on 
Commodity Markets should, subject to approval by the Banking Regulator, be 
allowed to trade up to limits required for the purpose of devising customized 
OTC products suited to the needs of small and marginal farmers. 
11.  National Exchanges are launching a pilot scheme of Aggregators’ who will 
collect retail produce of the farmers and hedge it on the platform of exchanges 
on behalf of the farmers. Farmers Groups, Co-operative institutions, RRBs, 
CCBs, NGOs, State Agricultural Marketing Boards, Warehousing 
Corporations, Commodity Development Boards which work in the rural areas 
and thus, have a close association and trust of farmers, should be allowed and 
encouraged to act as aggregators. The rules and procedures of futures trade in 
Exchanges should clearly lay down conditions to enable these entities to 
access the markets on behalf of the farmers. 
12.  It is of prime importance to create structure which enables dissemination of 
prices to the remotest corners of the country.  This will ensure that benefit of 
price discovery of exchange platforms reach the farmers.    32
13.  In case of agri commodities, only simple options may be allowed for some 
time till market attains maturity in operations and regulations, and farmers 
attain adequate understanding of the market and of technique to use them. 
Farmers should be encouraged to participate in these put options for which 
FCI can be the options writer. 
14.  There is a need to have a strong and resilient agriculture sector attracting 
investment for raising production and productivity. For this, it is necessary to 
make agriculture a remunerative option. The vibrant agriculture markets 
including derivatives markets are the frontline institutions to provide early 
sign of future prospects of the sector. Vibrancy in these markets gives signal 
about commodities which deserve flow of investment.  These markets deserve 
to be promoted for giving such signal. 
15.  Banning futures trading in agricultural commodities including basic food 
grains is not a desirable policy action. Policies to improve spot market 
functioning, enhance farmers’ knowledge of and access to futures markets, 
augment availability of adequate storage and financing against warehouse 
receipts and ensure transparent functioning of futures markets, are certainly 
warranted.    
16.  An efficient futures market requires government and markets working together 
in a synergistic manner. Both the government and markets, have to recognize 
the important role played by each other.  Governments can provide the legal, 
regulatory and infrastructure support to enable markets to function without 
manipulation and ‘excessive speculation’. On the other hand, markets need to 
provide the government with efficient mechanisms to achieve its objective of 
‘inclusive growth’. 
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Figure 2: Share of the Main Commodity Exchanges in India 
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Figure 4: Monthly Trend Growth Rate and Volatility of WPI of Selected (Top 
Ten in terms of Value) Agricultural Commodities in which Futures are traded 
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Figure 5: Daily Volatility in Major Agricultural Commodities 
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TV (Scenario 3)  37




































TV (Scenario 3)  38































IV (Scenario 3)  39
Figure 13: Simulated Daily Volatility of Copper 
 
Figure 14: Simulated Daily Volatility of Ref. Soya Oil 
 






































IV (Scenario 3)  40
Table- 1: Commodity Group-wise Value of Trade 
(Rs. Lakh Crores) 
 
Commodity  Groups  2004-05 2005-06 2006-07  2007-08 
 











































Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage to total value. Adopted from EC (2008) 
report.  
 
Table- 2: Turnover in Commodity Futures Market (Rs. crore) 
 




165147 961,633 1,621,803  2,505,206 
NCDEX  266,338 1,066,686  944,066  733,479 
NMCE 
(Ahmadabad)  13,988 18,385  101,731  24,072 
NBOT( Indore)  58,463 53,683  57,149  74,582 
Others  67,823 54,735  14,591  37,997 
All Exchanges  571,759 2,155,122  2,739,340 3,375,336 




Table- 3: Impact of Commodity Transaction Tax (CTT) on Transaction Cost 
 
Cost Components   Present Cost   Transaction cost after CTT 
Exchange transaction 
fees 
Rs. 2 to 3 per Rs. 
100000 
Rs. 2 per Rs. 100000 
Service Tax  Nil  Rs. O.25 (@of 12.5% Service 
Tax) 
CTT  Nil  Rs. 17 per Rs. 100000 
Total Cost  Rs. 2 per Rs. 100000  Minimum of Rs. 19.25 per Rs. 
100000 
 
Source: Forward Market Commission   41
Table- 4: Volume of Trade in Major Commodity Derivative Market 
 
Major  Exchanges  2003-04  2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) 
163.15   204.6 (25)  276.2 (35)  353.3 (28) 
Dalian Commodity Exchange 
(DCE) 
88.3   99.17 (13)  120.7 (19)  185.5 (54) 
Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) 
599  674.6 (12)  805.8 (19)  945.7 (20) 
Tokyo Commodity Exchange 
(TOCOM) 
74.4  61.8 (-17)  63.7 (3)  47.7 (-26) 
London Metals Exchange 
(LME) 
71.9  78.3 (9.3)  86.9 (11)  92.5 (7) 
Shanghai Futures Exchange 
(SHFE) 
40.57  33.7 (-16.7)   58.1 (72)  85.5 (48) 
Multi Commodity Exchange 
(MCX) 
  20.4  45.63 (122)  68.9 (51) 
National Commodity & 
Derivatives Exchange 
(NCDEX) 
  51.5  53.27 (4)  34.5 (-34) 
Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) 
805   1090.3 (35)  1409 (29)  2804 (50) 
 
Source: Futures Industry Association, Various years. 
Notes: Figures in the Bracket are % change. 
 
 















MCX  2.00 0.25  Nil  1.00  17.0  Nil  20.25
NYMEX  0.74 Nil  0.07 Nil  Nil  Nil  0.81 
CBOT  2.93 Nil  0.25 Nil  Nil  Nil  3.18 
ICE  0.82 Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  0.82 
TOCOM  1.23 Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  0.06  1.29 
CZCE  4.76 Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  4.76 
NYBOT  2.41 Nil  0.40 Nil  Nil  Nil  2.82 
CME  2.66 Nil  0.18 Nil   Nil  2.84 
DCE  3.64 Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  3.64 
MDEX  2.89 Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  2.89 
WINNEPEG  5.62 Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  5.62 
 
Source: Author’s compilation   42
Table- 6: Main Differences Between equity Derivative Markets and Commodity 
Derivative Markets 
 
Particulars Equity  Derivative  Markets  Commodity  Derivative 
Markets 
Size and Stage 
of growth 
Large volumes of trading and high 
depth. 
Relatively smaller and in 
its nascent stage 
Underlying   Shares Physical  commodities 
Settlement   Cash settled  Can be settled by physical 
delivery 
Instruments   Futures (including index) and 
options 
Only futures  
Participation  Wider participation; FIIs, Mutual 
funds, Banks, and Indian Financial 
Institutions, etc. 
Retail participation- 
proprietary/ client trades 
and some corporate 
participation 
Assets Class  Local (migration is generally not 
possible) 
Global and hence migration 
is possible. 
 
Source: Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table- 7: Transactions Taxes and Revenues 
 
TAX REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF 








FRANCE  30 & 15   0.26%  0.12%  1.19% 
GERMANY 25  0.14%  0.04%  0.28% 
ITALY 15  1.10%  0.38%  6.10% 
JAPAN  18 & 55  1.42%  0.17%  0.34% 
NETHERLANDS  50 on small 
trades 
0.63% 0.32%  1.17% 
SWEDEN 100  0.87%  0.36%  1.55% 
SWITZERLAND  15 & 30  2.33%  0.48%  0.94% 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
50 0.80%  0.30%  0.01% 
UNITED STATES  various state 
taxes 
0.17% 0.03%  0.08% 
 
Source: L.H. Summers and V.P. Summers, “When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A 
Cautious Case For a Securities Tax,” Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 3, 1989, 
p. 275.   43
Table- 8: Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Different Countries 
 
COUNTRY  Tax Rate (%)  Tax Revenue % of 
GDP (2005) 
Austria   1  0.03 
Belgium  0.5 (abolished in 2006)  0.053 
France   0.3 0.01 
Greece  1 0.8 
Ireland   0.5 (abolished in 2006)  1.6 
Spain   1 1.7 
U.K  0.5 0.8 
Japan  0.7 0.2 
Portugal  0.4 0.0 
Italy  0.009 - 0.14  0.4 
Finland   1.6 0.4 
Luxembourg  1 0.6 
Tawian  0.1 -0.3  N.A 
China   0.3 N.A 
Hong Kong   0.1 N.A 
 
Source: Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller, and Picek “A General Financial Transaction Tax –
Motives, Revenues, Feasibility and Effects” WIFO Working Paper, 2007. 
 
Table- 9: Impact of STT on Financial Market: A Global Experience 
 









Umalauf 1993   Increased reduced    Migration  of 
Volume 
Amhud and Mendlson 
1993 
 reduced     
Edwards 1993   reduced    Migration  of 
Volume 




Marion G Wroble 1996    reduced     
Jones and Seguin 1996  reduced      
Saporta and Kan 1997  insignificant     
Hu 1998  insignificant insignificant   
Chou and Lee 2002   reduced  Negative 
effect 
 
Chou and Wang 2005   Increased reduced     
Habermeier, and  
Kirilenko 2003 
increased reduced    Migration  of 
Volume 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation.   44





TV IV  BAS  OI  VSP 
GOLD -6.48**  -7.23**  -6.45**  -3.27* -4.47** 
Crude   -5.46**  -6.24**  -5.27**  -4.32*  -4.91** 
Copper -4.79** -6.134**  -7.57** -3.35*  -5.24** 
Ref Soya oil  -6.44**  -8.37**  -6.71**  -5.47*  -5.22** 
Chana -5.32**  -7.29**  -5.43* -5.43* -6.65** 
 
** indicates the rejection of null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level, * indicates the rejection 
of null hypothesis of unit root at 5% level. The critical values of the ADF unit root test at the 
1% and the 5% levels are –3.382 and –2.594.   45
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